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Forthcoming: TRANSNATIONAL LAW & CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS
Nazi Stolen Art: Uses and Misuses of the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act
by
Vivian Grosswald Curran*
Abstract
U.S. courts in Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act (“FSIA”) cases must interpret a
comprehensive statute which has been said to stand or fall on its terms. At the same time, in
Nazi-looted art cases, they do not ignore entirely the backdrop of the U.S.’ adoption of
international principles and declarations promising to ensure the return of such art. To some
extent, such an undertaking has been incorporated into a statutory amendment of the FSIA. The
years 2021 and 2022 have seen major developments in the FSIA both at the U.S. Supreme Court
and in the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals in cases involving Nazi looted art. The Supreme Court
ended what had been a judicially created exception to foreign state immunity for genocide,
refocused attention on whether the victim of property expropriation had been a de facto citizen,
rather than a formal one for purposes of the statute’s domestic takings exception, and decided
that there is no federal common law applicable to FSIA conflict of laws cases. The D.C. Circuit
reaffirmed prior caselaw that the FSIA does not require exhaustion of local remedies in a
decision supported by both the statute and international customary law, but leaving a potential
inter-circuit conflict if the Seventh Circuit should reaffirm its contrary prior caselaw. In an
opinion difficult to reconcile either with the FSIA’s express terms or with precedential authority,
the D.C. Circuit also decided to increase the difficulties to obtaining jurisdiction against a state,
as opposed to a state instrumentality.
Key words: Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act; Supreme Court developments; looted art
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Introduction

The Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act (“FSIA”)1 is, as the Supreme Court noted in
Republic of Germany v. Philipp2 in 2021, the only foreign sovereign immunities statute in the
world that contains an exception to a foreign state’s immunity for the state’s violations of
customary international law, otherwise known as jus cogens or fundamental human rights
violations: “the [FSIA’s] expropriation exception, because it permits the exercise of jurisdiction
over some public acts of expropriation … is unique; no other country has adopted a comparable
limitation on sovereign immunity.”3 This exception is located in Section 1605(a)(3) of the act,
dealing with property expropriations: “A foreign state shall not be immune from the jurisdiction
of courts of the United States or of the States in any case …(3) in which rights in property taken
in violation of international law are in issue …”4
The FSIA is a law of jurisdiction, technical in its provisions, but as the Alien Tort
Statute5 has receded as a mechanism for international human rights recovery since the Supreme

*Distinguished Professor of Law, University of Pittsburgh, Vice-President, International Academy of Comparative
Law. My sincerest thanks to Anne Schiff who kindly referred me to Pauline Baer de Pérignon’s The Vanished
Collection, and to Dina Babbitt’s story.
1
28 U.S.C. §§ 1602-1611.
2
141 S. Ct. 703 (2021).
3
Id., at 713, citing RESTATEMENT (FOURTH) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 455,
REPORTERS’ NOTE 15 (2017). Accord, HAZEL FOX & PHILIPPA WEBB, THE LAW OF STATE IMMUNITY 430-31 (3d ed.
2015).
4
Id. at 713. The textual reference in the FSIA is to “international law” violations, referring to customary
international law. Customary international law evolved from natural law to the customs accepted by “civilized
nations.” See William S. Dodge, Customary International Law and the Question of Legitimacy, 120 HARV. L. REV.
F. 19 (2007). For the view that customary international law violations will not enable jurisdiction where one state
sues another in an international tribunal for money damages related to fundamental human rights violations (Nazi
military massacres in Italy during the Second World War), see Germany v. Italy, Jurisdictional Immunities of the
State, (Ger. V. It.), Judgment, 2012 I.C.J. Rep. 99, at paras. 1, 15-17 (Feb. 3).
5
28 U.S.C. §1350.
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Court’s Kiobel decision,6 the FSIA at times has been stretched to and beyond its limits in an
attempt to create a new jurisdictional avenue for some international human rights violations, with
varying degrees of success. Thus, for example, until the Supreme Court disagreed in Philipp,
several courts had judicially carved a genocide exception to foreign sovereign immunity into
Section 1605 even though none existed textually.7 In addition, the immunity exception of
Section 1605 (a) (3) that has been invoked for Nazi-era crimes often has been cloaked in the
language pf property law to disguise the fact that underlying torts are the gravamen of the
complaints, because the statute would preclude suing for torts committed by Nazis in Europe.8
The FSIA courts which decide Nazi stolen art cases struggle to accommodate potentially
mutually incompatible FSIA statutory provisions with each other,9 and to deal with defendant
states and entities still battling plaintiffs close to eighty years after survivors started to seek the
return of their property. One can get a sense of how distasteful defendants’ arguments can be
from an ongoing Nazi-looted art case not involving the FSIA, where the original plaintiff, Dina
Babbitt, was a prisoner in the death camp of Auschwitz and was forced to make paintings for Dr.
Mengele, the Nazi torturer.10 She was unable throughout her life to obtain the return of her
paintings from the Auschwitz museum where they now hang. Her daughters have continued to
seek their recovery since her death, and have been faced by the museum’s apparently seriously
maintained argument that it owns the paintings and, if not, that they belong to Dr. Mengele’s

6

See Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 569 U.S. 108 (2013).
As I developed more fully elsewhere, in my view the genocide exception was both unnecessary for plaintiffs and
harmful to genocide law. See Vivian Grosswald Curran, The Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act’s Evolving
Genocide Exception, 23 UCLA J. INT’L . L. & FOR. AFF. 46 (2019).
8
Here, I refer to cases that do not involve stolen art, such as Philipp’s companion case, Simon. Under FSIA § 1605
(a) (5), a foreign state must commit the torts in the United States to come within the jurisdiction of U.S. courts.
9
See FSIA §§ 1605 (a) (3) and 1605 (h) (2); and infra note 41, and surrounding text.
10
See Dina Babbitt, Artist at Auschwitz, Is Dead at 86, N. Y. TIMES (August 1, 2009), available at
https://www.nytimes.com/2009/08/02/arts/02babbitt.html (last viewed August 3, 2022).
7
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heirs.11 In the FSIA art cases, defendants also may argue that the plaintiffs or plaintiffs’ ancestors
willingly sold valuable art under the Nazi regime, when in fact such sales were coerced in one
way or another.12 In Von Saher v. Norton Simon,13 the Netherlands described the coercion
exercised by Hermann Göring, Nazi creator of the Gestapo and one of the greatest thieves of
Nazi stolen art throughout the war, as “voluntary sales without coercion.”14 Similarly, in Philipp,
another case in which Göring coveted plaintiffs’ ancestors’ art, Germany successfully argued to a
commission set up in Germany under the Washington Principles, and which initially adjudicated
plaintiffs’ claims, that the transaction had been voluntary.15 This argument seems to have been
made once again by the defendants in the latest (as of this writing) iteration of the Philipp case to
have been adjudicated, and to have been accepted by the D.C. Federal District Court which
described the sale of the fantastically valuable Welfenschatz art work as having been
“negotiated” by Prussia with its Jewish art owners in June of 1935, as though such negotiations
at such a time were at arms’ length.16 And finally, in a case decided in August of 2022, Toren v.
Federal Republic of Germany,17 Germany argued successfully to the D.C. Federal District Court
that it was protected under the domestic takings exception against a German Jewish art owner
whom the Gestapo imprisoned and murdered in 1942 because, according to Germany, he

11

See id.; see also Ofer Aderet, The Nazis Made Her Paint Portraits. The Auschwitz Museum Claims They Belong
to Mengele, HAARETZ, July 16, 2022 (last viewed August 3, 2022), available at https://www.haaretz.com/worldnews/2022-07-16/ty-article-magazine/.highlight/the-nazis-made-her-paint-portraits-the-auschwitz-museum-claimsthey-belong-to-mengele/00000182-0346-dbce-a1e2-47eed60b0000
12
For a good account of not just Nazi forced sales but of the derisory amounts paid to Jewish art owners, see LYNN
H. NICHOLAS, THE RAPE OF EUROPA: THE FATE OF EUROPE’S TREASURES IN THE THIRD REICH AND THE SECOND
WORLD WAR 26-40 (2d ed. 1995) (1st ed., Vintage 1994).
13
754 F.3d 712 (9th Cir. 2014).
14
Chloe Ricke, The Time Is Now: Why the United States Should Follow the United Kingdom’s Lead and
Implement a Federal Spoliation Advisory Panel, 44 Ga. J. Int’l. & Comp. L. 665, 680 (2016).
15 See Philipp, 894 F.3d 406, 410 (D.C. Cir. 2018).
16
Philipp v. Stiftung Preussischer Kulturbesitz, -- F. Supp. 3d --, 2022 WL 3681348 (Memorandum Opinion,
D.D.C., August 25, 2022), at *2.
17
WL 3646307 (August 24, 2022).
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counted as a German national under German law in 1939, albeit four years after enactment of the
Nuremberg Laws.18
U.S. courts are not oblivious to U.S. policies, embedded in another FSIA subsection and
in U.S. foreign policy, which explicitly endorse the return of Nazi looted art to survivors and
their descendant claimants.19 The states and state instrumentalities which retain stolen art from
the heirs of the dispossessed, depending on the case, nevertheless may be entitled to immunity
from suit in the United States under a fair interpretation of the FSIA.20 The Court’s struggle was
clear in Philipp where the Supreme Court simultaneously ended an unwarranted genocide
exception, but also sua sponte suggested another door under domestic takings.21
It has been said of Nazi looted art that the very topic “evokes a vanished world that once
stood at the crossroads between the heights of civilization and the depths of barbarism….”22 The
recent FSIA cases dealing with such art, including two decided by the U. S. Supreme Court since
2021, bring that world into the present inasmuch as they are not just cases involving art stolen
during World War II and the families which have sought to reclaim it. They also are about

18

The short Toren memorandum opinion does not explore or explain the fact that in 1939, the date of expropriation,
and four years after the Nuremberg Laws were enacted, no Jew could be a German citizen or national pursuant to
German law -- the term used for the status of Jews was “subjects” (“Staatsangehörige”). See infra, note 96. The
Toren court’s references to the Supreme Court’s Philipp decision as mandating dismissal of the case are cursory and
conclusory so its conclusion that the Supreme Court’s decision in Philipp mandates dismissal in Toren is difficult to
follow.
19
See FSIA § 1605 (h) (2) and infra note 19, and surrounding text; and infra note 15, and surrounding text.
20
See, e.g., Cassirer v. Thyssen Bornemisza Collection Foundation, 153 F. Supp.3d 1148, 1168 (2015), rev’d and
remanded (9th Cir. 2017), vacated and remanded, 142 S. Ct. 1502 (2022).
21
The Philipp court also conceded that policy favored returning Nazi looted art while maintaining that FSIA § 1605
(a) (3) involved only international property expropriation law, not international human rights law, as claimants
argued under the genocide exception. For my own elaboration on the domestic takings clause, under the de facto
test, as a better solution to plaintiffs’ claims, predating the Supreme Court Philipp decision, see Curran, The Foreign
Sovereign Immunities Act Evolving Genocide Exception, supra note []; and following the Phillip decision, Vivian
Grosswald Curran, Appraising the Supreme Court’s Philipp Decision, 83 U. PITT. L. REV. 303 (2021).
22
James Gardner, reviewing PAULINE BAER DE PÉRIGNON, THE VANISHED COLLECTION (trans. Natasha Lehrer
2020) (unpaginated page).
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foreign governments and entities which continue to this day to refuse to return the art, and are
willing to fight in court with every means at their disposal to retain it.
Thus, in granting summary judgment to one defendant due to the court’s interpretation of
the lack of available relief under the FSIA, a California district court nevertheless ended its
decision by urging the defendant to reach some other more plaintiff-friendly solution than the
ownership of the painting the court had just granted it:
Although the [defendant] Foundation has now prevailed in this prolonged and
bitterly contested litigation, the Court recommends that, before the next phase of
litigation commences in the Ninth Circuit, the Foundation pause, reflect, and consider
whether it would be appropriate to work towards a mutually-agreeable resolution of this
action, in light of Spain’s acceptance of the Washington Conference Principles23 and the
Terezin Declaration,24 and, specifically, its commitment to achieve “just and fair
solutions” for victims of Nazi persecution.25
The defendant did not agree to return the painting, and the litigation then proceeded to the Ninth
Circuit, eventually followed by a 2022 Supreme Court decision. Currently it is on remand for
further proceedings as this article is being written. In referencing the Washington Conference
Principles and the Terezin Declaration, the California district court was encouraging the
defendant to adhere to nonbinding commitments undertaken by many governments, including
defendant’s government of Spain, to ensure that their countries return Nazi looted art.26 The
Washington Conference Principles and the Terezin Declaration also represent commitments
made by the United States to ensure that it oversee the return of such art.27 One such effort to

23

See https://www.state.gov/washington-conference-principles-on-nazi-confiscated-art/ (last visited August 3, 2022).
See Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Czech Republic, Terezin Declaration, available at
https://www.mzv.cz/jnp/en/foreign_relations/terezin_declaration/index.html (last visited August 3, 2022).
25
Cassirer, 153 F. Supp.3d 1148, at 1168.
26
See supra, notes 18 and 19.
27
See infra, Part II. The United States was a signatory. See supra, last note.
24
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implement this undertaking by the United States was the passage of the Holocaust Expropriated
Art, or “HEAR”, Act of 2016.28
Even if otherwise courts in the U.S. would adjudicate cases relating to Nazi-looted art
through the lens of such political commitments, FSIA courts, including the Supreme Court, have
placed limits on the FSIA’s interpretive elasticity notwithstanding these government
commitments due to the challenges imposed by the FSIA’s comprehensive nature.29 Moreover,
the public policy of returning looted art has confronted the judicial policy, in FISA and nonFSIA cases, of limiting U.S. jurisdiction to cases deemed to have a sufficiently strong connection
to the United States, better known as the presumption against extraterritoriality.30 The Supreme
Court has asserted its endorsement of a strong presumption against extraterritoriality in a
growing line of cases.31 In its focus on rejecting extraterritorial jurisdiction, the Court
analogized the Alien Tort Statute in Kiobel to statutes and cases arising in commercial law, thus
shifting the Alien Tort Statute from the terrain of human rights to logic developed for
commercial law.32 The Court continued that reasoning with respect to the FSIA in Philipp
inasmuch as it cited to Kiobel and Microsoft for their (and its own) presumption against

28

Holocaust Expropriated Art Recovery (HEAR) Act of 2016, Pub. L. No. 114-308, § 5, 130 Stat. 1524, 1526–28 (2016). See
infra Part II. The Cassirer court found that the statute of limitations had not expired due to the HEAR Act,
as did the court in De Csepel, 859 F.3d 1094, 1097 (D.C. Cir. 2017). For a longer discussion of the HEAR Act,
including a critique of its shortcomings, see Simon J. Frankel & Sari Sharoni, Navigating the Ambiguities and
Uncertainties of the Holocaust Expropriated Art Recovery Act of 2016, 42 COLUM. J. L. & ARTS 157 (2019).
29
On its comprehensive nature see, see Republic of Argentina v. NML Capital, 573 U.S. 134, 141 (2014) (referring
to Austria v. Altmann, 541 U.S. 677, 699 (2004) (“the key word is …comprehensive”) and Verlinden B.V. v. Cent.
Bank of Nigeria, 461 U.S. 480, 493 (1983); and “any sort of immunity defense made by a foreign sovereign in an
American court must stand on the Act’s text. Or it must fall.”Id.
30
For the trend away from extraterritorial jurisdiction, see, e.g., William S. Dodge, The New Presumption against
Extraterritoriality, 133 HARV. L. REV. 1582 (2020).
31
See Microsoft Corp. v. AT&T Corp., 550 U.S. 437 (2007); Morrison v. Nat’l Austl. Bank Ltd., 561 U.S. 247
(2010); J. McIntyre Machinery, Ltd v. Nicastro, 564 U.S. 873 (2011); Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 569
U.S. 108 (2013); Nestlé USA, Inc. v. Doe, 141 S. Ct.1931 (2021).
32
See Kiobel, 569 U.S. at 1664.
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extraterritoriality: “United States law governs domestically but does not rule the world.”33 In
Philipp, however, the Court also suggested a viable legal theory under the FSIA for plaintiffs sua
sponte, thus attempting to accommodate the presumption against territoriality with the policy
supporting the return of Nazi looted art to its victims.34

II.

The FSIA, International Legal Principles on Nazi Looted Art Restitution, and
National Statutory Measures
A. The FSIA Is a Comprehensive Statute

The FSIA is a comprehensive, self-contained statute according to both its legislative history
and to the Supreme Court’s interpretation.35 Although the opinion of the Executive branch
concerning foreign policy has been taken into consideration in FSIA cases, the purpose of the
statute was to wrest the area of sovereign immunity from the hands of the Executive branch and
place it in that of the judiciary.36 The relevance of the Executive branch was and is considered
controversial for this reason.37
Amendments to the FSIA reference, among others, loss of immunity for states on a U.S.
Department of State list of terrorist states;38 they also reference Nazi looted art in the overall
context of freeing foreign states from amenability to jurisdiction where they lend art exhibits to
U.S. museums, provided, however, that the art at issue is not subject to claims of being Nazi stolen

33

Philipp, 141 U.S. 703, at 714.
See id., at 715 – 716.
35
See 28 U.S.C. § 1602 (“Claims of foreign states . . . should henceforth be decided by courts . . . in
conformity with the principles set forth [herein].”).
36
Republic of Austria v. Altmann, 541 U.S. 677, 691 (2004). See H.R. Rep. No. 94-1487, p. 97 (1976), U.S. Code
Cong. & Admin. News 1976, at 6605-6 (sovereign immunity decisions are [to be] made exclusively by the courts
and not by a foreign affairs agency”). See also Altmann, 541 U.S. 677, at 717 (Kennedy, J., dissenting) (“the Act
sought to implement its objectives by removing the Executive influence from the standard determination of
sovereign immunity questions.”)
37
See id., at 734 (Kennedy, J. dissenting) (objecting to the majority’s view that the Executive has a role in giving its
opinion in FSIA cases).
38
See FSIA § 1605A.
34
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art.39 The U.S. public policy of ensuring the return of such art has therefore entered into
considerations within the FSIA, albeit not explicitly within Section 1605 (a) (3). Judges
entertaining FSIA §1605 cases both apply the canons of statutory construction for this selfcontained statute,40 which can lead to two contrary interpretations,41 and keep in mind underlying
policy. As we have seen,42 one FSIA court has made explicit reference to the Washington
Conference Principles, the Terezin Declaration and the HEAR Act.43 It should also be kept in mind
that courts generally look to customary international law in interpreting the meaning of
international law violations under the FSIA.44
B. The Washington Conference, the Terezin Declaration, the HEAR Act and Other
Domestic Measures

In recent years, international law has not governed Nazi looted art other than in a nonbinding form. Initially, in 1952, after the end of the Second World War, the Western Allies signed
a treaty with the Federal republic of Germany to regulate the restitution of property, incorporated

FSIA § 1605 (h) (2). More specifically, the amendment provides that lending the art is in general not “commercial
activity” within the meaning of FSIA § 1605 (3) unless it is subject to claims of having been looted by the Nazis.
FSIA § 1605 (h) (2). Section 1605 (3) abrogates immunity where “rights in property [are] taken in violation of
international law are in issue and that property or any property exchanged for such property is present in the United
States in connection with a commercial activity carried on in the United States by the foreign state; or that property
or any property exchanged for such property is owned or operated by an agency or instrumentality of the foreign
state and that agency or instrumentality is engaged in a commercial activity in the United States…”
40
See Republic of Argentina v. NML Capital, Ltd., 573 U.S. 134 (2014).
41
See infra note 51, and surrounding text.
42
After the recent D.C. Circuit decision in De Csepel v. Republic of Hungary, suits against foreign states, as
opposed to public foreign museums considered state instrumentalities may well be curtailed in in the D.C. Circuit.
See infra, Section IV, B. Accord, Jonathan Freiman & David Roth, U.S. Changes the Rules for Claims of Nazilooted Art against Foreign Sovereigns and Foreign Public Museums, INTERNATIONAL BAR ASSOCIATION: ART,
CULTURAL AND HERITAGE LAW (November 17, 2017), available at https://www.wiggin.com/publication/uschanges-the-rules-for-claims-of-nazi-looted-art-against-foreign-sovereigns-and-foreign-public-museums/ (last
visited August 23, 2022).
43
While U.S. courts may adjudicate cases dealing with claims of Nazi looted art through the lens of all three where
the FSIA does not govern, one commentator concludes the contrary. See Bert Demarsin, Let’s Not Talk About
Terezin: Restitution of Nazi Looted Art and the Tenuousness of Public International Law, 37 BROOKLYN J. INT’L L.
117 (2011) (U.S. courts do not take Terezin Declaration or Washington Conference Principles into account and tend
to dismiss claims for the recovery of Nazi looted art).
44
See RESTATEMENT (FOURTH) U.S. FOREIGN RELATIONS §455, comment c (either customary international law or
the text of an applicable treaty).
39
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into West German statutory law.45 In more recent years, the U.S. entered into bilateral agreements
with individual European countries for property compensation, but these did not relate to looted
art.46

Rather, they addressed issues of compensation for stolen property more generally.

International law governing Nazi looted art is a matter of wide agreement on paper, but only as
soft law.47 It emerged in an era marked by a resurgence of interest in Nazi looted art, as (1) the
opening of archives after the fall of the USSR permitted expanded research48; (2) the internet
enhanced art research and communication capabilities through digital databases;49 and (3) the U.S.
Supreme Court held that foreign states could be sued in U.S. courts under the FSIA for acts which
preceded the 1976 enactment of the FSIA.50

The Washington Conference was organized by the U.S. Department of State in December
of 1998, producing eleven short principles, among others urging nations to “achieve a just and
fair solution” (Principle 8).51 When, a decade later, another international meeting was convened,

45

Convention on Relations Between the Three Powers and the Federal Republic of Germany, signed 26 May 1952
(Bundesgesetzblatt 1955 II 29.03. 1954, No. 3.). For a detailed description of the Allies’ measures both before and
after the end of the war with respect to property restitution, see K. LUBINA, CONTESTED CULTURAL PROPERTY: THE
RETURN OF NAZI SPOLIATED ART AND HUMAN REMAINS FROM PUBLIC COLLECTIONS, Chapter I, § VII (2009),
available at https://core.ac.uk/download/pdf/231329125.pdf (last viewed August 3, 2022).
46
See generally, MICHAEL J. BAZYLER, HOLOCAUST JUSTICE: THE BATTLE FOR JUSTICE IN AMERICA’S COURTS
(2003).
47
All of the international Declarations and Principles discussed in this section are non-binding. Only national laws,
such as the HEAR Act, have binding effect.
48
LUBINA, supra note 38, at 160-161.
49
E.g., The Art Loss Register at https://www.artloss.com; and the International Foundation for Art Research at
https://www.ifar.org/cat_rais.php.
50
See Altmann v. Republic of Austria, 541 U.S. 647 (2004) (Since the FSIA is a law of jurisdiction, it does not
violate the principle of non-retroactivity of substantive law).
51

The Washington Principles are as follows: “1.Art that had been confiscated by the Nazis and not subsequently
restituted should be identified. 2.Relevant records and archives should be open and accessible to researchers, in
accordance with the guidelines of the International Council on Archives. 3. Resources and personnel should be made
available to facilitate the identification of all art that had been confiscated by the Nazis and not subsequently restituted.
4.In establishing that a work of art had been confiscated by the Nazis and not subsequently restituted, consideration
should be given to unavoidable gaps or ambiguities in the provenance in light of the passage of time and the
circumstances of the Holocaust era. 5. Every effort should be made to publicize art that is found to have been confiscated
by the Nazis and not subsequently restituted in order to locate its pre-War owners or their heirs. 6. Efforts should be
made to establish a central registry of such information. 7. Pre-War owners and their heirs should be encouraged to come
forward and make known their claims to art that was confiscated by the Nazis and not subsequently restituted. 8. If the
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this time in Terezin, or Theresienstadt (as Nazi Germany called the ghetto which was a
waystation to Auschwitz once located there) forty-seven states attended,52 three more than at the
Washington Conference.53 The Terezin Declaration explicitly reaffirmed the Washington
Principles, but also added others.54 Notable in its much longer text is the commitment on the part
of the signatories “to make certain that claims to recover such art are resolved expeditiously and
based on the facts and merits of the claims …”55 Like the Washington Principles, it too is soft
law. The countries involved in defending against returning the relevant art to plaintiffs in the
recent FSIA cases discussed in these pages were signatories to the Terezin Declaration and were
among those present at the Washington Conference who produced its Principles and adopted
them by consensus.

In addition to signing the Terezin Declaration, the United States has passed the HEAR Act
to implement Paragraph 3’s commitment of ensuring that cases be heard on their merits rather
than be dismissed for procedural reasons, such as, in the case of the HEAR Act, statutes of

pre-War owners of art that is found to have been confiscated by the Nazis and not subsequently restituted, or their heirs,
can be identified, steps should be taken expeditiously to achieve a just and fair solution, recognizing this may vary
according to the facts and circumstances surrounding a specific case. 9. If the pre-War owners of art that is found to have
been confiscated by the Nazis, or their heirs, can not be identified, steps should be taken expeditiously to achieve a just
and fair solution. 10. Commissions or other bodies established to identify art that was confiscated by the Nazis and to
assist in addressing ownership issues should have a balanced membership. 11. Nations are encouraged to develop
national processes to implement these principles, particularly as they relate to alternative dispute resolution mechanisms
for resolving ownership issues.”, available at https://www.state.gov/washington-conference-principles-on-naziconfiscated-art/ (last visited August 3, 2022).
52
The Holy See attended as an observer; the remaining forty-six signed the Declaration. See Ministry of Foreign
Affairs of the Czech Republic, Terezin Declaration, available at
https://www.mzv.cz/jnp/en/foreign_relations/terezin_declaration/index.html (last visited August 3, 2022).
53
See Stuart Eizenstat, Under Secretary of State for Economic, Business, and Agricultural Affairs,
Briefing on the Washington Conference on Holocaust-Era Assets Conference and release of proceedings of the
conference, Washington, DC, May 20, 1999, available at https://fcit.usf.edu/holocaust/resource/assets/heac.htm (last
visited August 3, 2022).
54
See Terezin Declaration, June 30, 2009, available at
https://www.mzv.cz/public/b9/af/cb/4297655_2634845_Terezin_Declaration_FullText.pdf (last visited August 3,
2022).
55
Id., at para. 3 (emphasis added).
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limitations.56 Moreover, in 2018 the United States also enacted the Justice for Uncompensated
Survivors Today (“JUST”) Act, requiring the U.S. Secretary of State to report to Congress on the
ongoing implementation efforts of the Terezin Declaration’s forty-seven signatories, and room for
improvement.57 A European Union soft law regulation dating a year after the Washington
Principles also urges the return of Nazi-looted art, and also is soft law.58
A final international meeting was held in Vilnius, Lithuania. Holding such a Europeanwide conference was one of the suggestions contained in the European Parliament Resolution
1205. It was carried out in 2000, the year after the EU Parliament Resolution 1205.59 One
assessment of the Vilnius Forum, also producing no more than recommendations, is of a fairly
weak result inasmuch as its recommendations are peppered with qualifiers, such as “reasonable”
before “measures” to be taken,60 and that it was understood by the Vilnius Forum that “solutions
to restitution may vary ‘according to the differing legal systems among countries.’”61
In summary, current international law is soft law of precatory force only, but it becomes
hard law when national legislatures enact statutes to implement it. In common law countries like
the United States, it also becomes hard law to the extent that courts implement it, since stare decisis
subsequently transforms it into a binding, precedential source of law. In the FSIA cases which
follow, it should be remembered that the FSIA is comprehensive. The references within the statute
to property subject to claims relating to the Holocaust can, however, lead to two opposite,
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legitimate conclusions under the rules of U.S. statutory interpretation: (1) that FSIA § 1605 (a) (3)
should be interpreted in contradistinction to the references to claims that art was stolen by the
Nazis (Section 1605 (h) )2)) because Section 1605(a) (3) does not contain any explicit reference
to Nazi looted property or art itself; or (2) that FSIA § 1605(a) (3) should be interpreted in light of
the public policy contained in other parts of Section 1605 to illuminate the public policy underlying
the entire statute and the entire section. As the cases also make clear, the latter interpretation must
not be deemed incompatible with the presumption against extraterritoriality which the Supreme
Court has been endorsing ever more strongly, including in FSIA caselaw, but even while the
Supreme Court has also cited the FSIA’s origins in foreign policy in supporting its conclusions.62
III.

FSIA Developments from 2021 to 2022
A. Ending the Genocide Exception

The Supreme Court’s 2021 Philipp decision made clear that the D.C. and Seventh Circuits’
creation within FSIA § 1605 (a) (3) of a special exception to immunity where a property taking
was deemed to have been a genocide was not warranted by the statute.63 The Seventh Circuit had
created the exception, describing it as a taking in connection to a genocidal project, “an integral

part[] of [an] overall genocidal plan.”64
This exception was further extended by the D.C. Circuit which insisted that the property
taking was itself the genocide, no matter how minimal in nature: “these expropriations
themselves amount to genocide,”65 as in the case before it where deportees en route to Auschwitz
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65
Simon, 812 F.3d at 133.

13

from Hungary had been robbed of their last possessions by their guards.66 The courts in these
cases did not consider how they might be altering the meaning of the law of genocide with their
rulings, contributing to the growing problem of its dilution and politicization.67 The Court in
Philipp held that FSIA § 1605 (a) (3) requires plaintiffs to prove their case under the
international law of property, not of international human rights: “the expropriation exception is
best read as referencing the international law of expropriation rather than of human rights.”68
The international law of expropriation, however, overlaps with fundamental human rights in that
it is violated where a state expropriates property without compensation and in a discriminatory
way.69 That the FSIA enactors aimed to address discriminatory takings is clear from the House
Report on the statute’s legislative history. The Report specifies that takings in violation of
international law within the meaning of the FSIA are “takings which are arbitrary or
discriminatory in nature,”70 and for which the victim has not received “prompt, adequate and
effective compensation;”71 namely, also the standard definition of property expropriation in
international law and in the Restatement (Fourth) on U.S. Foreign Relations.72
The Supreme Court implicitly accepted as much in Philipp by specifying that it was leaving
undecided the issue of whether plaintiffs really had been German citizens at the time of the alleged
taking, and by instructing the lower court to examine that on remand, along with the question of
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whether the plaintiffs had preserved the issue by raising it below.73 Indeed, it was in response to
the justices’ questions at oral argument about whether the plaintiffs truly had been German citizens
at the relevant time that plaintiffs’ counsel argued they had not.74 The pleadings on remand
accordingly focused on this issue, with defendant claiming that the citizenship question has been
foreclosed because plaintiffs did not raise it until they reached the Supreme Court,75 and plaintiffs
maintaining that they raised the issue from the beginning because the facts they alleged from their
earliest pleadings gave rise to such an inference.76 The plaintiffs had recounted facts about
Germany during the Nazi time which were sufficient for a court to have concluded that Germany
did not consider them to be citizens, but plaintiffs had relied on the genocide theory of recovery
in their pleadings.77
The Supreme Court’s instruction suggests two conclusions: (1) the well-established
common law principle that plaintiffs bore the burden of stating the theory in their pleadings and
briefs; and (2), perhaps most significantly, that the Court is receptive to the view that minorities
and vulnerable populations not treated as full citizens by their de jure state still are not nationals
of that state within the meaning of the FSIA and do not come within the domestic takings
exception, such that the foreign state is amenable to jurisdiction under FSIA §1605 (a) (3).

B. Refocusing Domestic Takings on a Substantive Citizenship Test

73

See Philipp, 141 S. Ct., at 715-716.
The oral argument is available at https://www.supremecourt.gov/oral_arguments/audio/2020/19-351 (last visited
August 26, 2022).
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77 See Plaintiffs’ Complaint, 2015 WL 757806; and First Amended Complaint, 2016 WL 510536, in Philipp. The
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Numerous courts in the past have imposed a substantive, rather than formal, citizenship test,
notably lower and appellate courts in FSIA cases.78 In Cassirer, the Ninth Circuit had applied the
following substantive test to the domestic takings exception of FSIA §1605 (a) (3), taken from
the lower court, and not challenged on appeal: whether the plaintiff “was regarded as a citizen
by Germany” when the property expropriation occurred.79 In De Csepel v Republic of
Hungary,80 the lower court applied the same test, citing Kaku Nagano v. McGrath81 for the
proposition that
“a citizen is one who has the right to exercise all the political and civil privileges
extended by his government . . . Citizenship conveys the idea of membership in a nation . . . .”82
In De Csepel both the D.C. district court and the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals held that the
expropriation of plaintiffs’ Nazi looted art fell was not a domestic taking because,
[a]s of 1944, Hungarian Jews could not acquire citizenship by means of
naturalization, marriage, or legalization; vote or be elected to public office; be
employed as civil servants, state employees, or schoolteachers; enter into
enforceable contracts; participate in various industries and professions; participate in
paramilitary youth training or serve in the armed forces; own property; or acquire
title to land or other immovable property. Moreover, all Hungarian Jews over the age of
six were required to wear distinctive signs identifying themselves as Jewish, and were
ultimately subject to complete forfeiture of all assets, forced labor inside and outside
Hungary, and ultimately genocide.83

The Court further stated that the test was de facto, not de jure: regardless of whether the
plaintiff “still considered herself to be a Hungarian citizen in 1944, it is clear that . . . the
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government of Hungary thought otherwise and had de facto stripped her . . . and all
Hungarian Jews of their citizenship rights.”84
A D.C. district court post-Philipp analysis of this issue also entered into considerable and
thoughtful detail, agreeing with the earlier substantive citizenship test cases discussed above, and
based on the Supreme Court’s 2021 reasoning in Philipp, deciding that the test is whether the
foreign state’s law at the time of the plaintiff’s dispossession considered plaintiff to be a national.85
The district court in that FSIA case, Ambar v. Federal Republic of Germany,86 also cited
international citizenship law, not just the U.S. perspective on what constitutes a citizen as had
Cassirer and De Csepel, in concluding that the relevant foreign state’s own laws are
determinative.87 Taking its lead from the Supreme Court in Philipp that the exceptions to immunity
under FSIA § 1605 are construed narrowly, the court nevertheless denied defendant’s motion to
dismiss where the plaintiff had been a German Jew after the passage of the anti-Jewish Nazi
Nuremberg laws.88 In fact, Germany was not contesting that plaintiff’s property had been
expropriated because he was Jewish, but defendant argued in that case that the applicable German
law of citizenship was post-war German law.89 The D.C. district court rejected this argument, in
keeping with the earlier courts which had focused on the time of expropriation as the relevant
moment for identifying plaintiff’s nationality.90
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As seen above, the Cassirer case, involving the coerced transfer of plaintiff’s grandmother’s
Pissarro painting for a derisory amount as the price for the owner to obtain an exit visa from
Germany, also used the de facto citizenship test,91 as did De Csepel, which concerned an
enormously valuable painting collection in Hungary.92 Not only did the U.S. Supreme Court deny
certiorari in Cassirer after the Ninth Circuit adopted the de facto substantive citizenship test of
looking to whether the foreign state had regarded the plaintiff as its full citizen at the time of the
expropriation, never a sign from the Supreme Court in and of itself of substantive approval of the
appellate court’s decision, but the Supreme Court did subsequently grant certiorari in the same
case in 2022, leaving untouched the nationality issue as decided by the Ninth Circuit, and decided
only one issue: if state or federal conflicts of law rules applied to this FSIA case.93
The district court decision to dismiss Philipp on remand made no reference to the de facto
substantive citizen test which U.S. FSIA courts have established. Rather, it adopted the simplistic
dichotomy defendant had suggested of analyzing the plaintiffs as either being German “nationals”
or as being “stateless”,94 even though Germany under Hitler had other categories, and the court
tried to equate a de facto substantive citizenship test with the genocide exception that the Supreme
Court had rejected, but which the earlier courts establishing the de facto test had never espoused.95
The D.C. district court’s uncritical acceptance of defendant’s argument, however, is not the test
under the FSIA domestic takings exception. At the time of the expropriation of plaintiffs’ art, June
of 1935, just three months before Germany stripped all Jews de jure of their German citizenship,
making them not German “nationals” (as claimed by defendants, and repeated by the district court),
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but merely German “subjects,” their de facto subjugation was in full place: they were not entitled
to practice professions, their books were burned, and they were excluded from the Volk.96 Finally,
the Supreme Court’s Philipp decision, containing the Court’s inquiry about the plaintiffs’
citizenship role in Germany and its direction that this be explored on remand, suggest Supreme
Court agreement with the de facto substantive citizenship test.
C. Exhaustion of Local Remedies
An issue unresolved by the Supreme Court’s recent decisions is if the FSIA mandates or
allows for the exhaustion of local remedies. Defendants argued in Philipp’s companion case,
Simon, 97 as defendants also did in Section 1605 (a) (3) looted art cases such as Altmann,98 that
the U.S. courts lack jurisdiction where plaintiffs have not first brought their suit in the defendant
state under principles of exhaustion of local remedies. The issue of whether FSIA §1605 (a) (3)
requires exhaustion of local remedies resulted in an inter-circuit split, which the Supreme Court
did not resolve in Philipp, but which has been addressed post-Philipp by the D.C. Circuit Court of
Appeals in De Csepel.99
In the reprised 2022 De Csepel opinion, the D.C. Circuit has held that, although the
Supreme Court’s vacatur in Philipp allowed for the subsequent reopening of the issue, it
nevertheless reaffirmed its prior holdings in Simon and Philipp that FSIA § 1605 (a) (3) does not
require the exhaustion of local remedies:

The German word used in the Nuremberg Laws for Jews was “Staatsangehörige,” a term translated into English
as “subjects”, not “nationals” as the defendants argued and the court accepted uncritically. It should also be noted
that the district court purported to discuss the issues of plaintiffs’ preservation of their claims about domestic takings
and the substantive issue of nationality as two separate matters, but in fact conflated the two: “While Plaintiffs rely
on language from the Nazi party platform that ‘no Jew may be a member of the [German] nation, that language was
not included in their Complaint.” Id., at 12* (internal citation omitted).
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We reaffirm our holdings and rationales in Simon and Philipp that the FSIA does
not require prudential exhaustion in suits against foreign states. The FSIA
“replac[ed] the old executive-driven, factor-intensive, loosely common-law-based
immunity regime” with a “ ‘comprehensive set of legal standards governing
claims of immunity in every civil action against a foreign state. Thus, any sort of
immunity defense made by a foreign sovereign in an American court must stand
on the Act's text. Or it must fall.” In particular, “[w]hen Congress wanted to
require the pursuit of foreign remedies as a predicate to FSIA jurisdiction, it said
so explicitly.” The terrorism exception, for example, requires a claimant to first
“afford[ ] the foreign state a reasonable opportunity to arbitrate the claim.” 100
The circuit split before the Supreme Court’s decision in Philipp had been between the
D.C. and Seventh Circuits; it is not yet known if the Seventh Circuit will continue to require
exhaustion.101
The D.C. Circuit seems to have the more persuasive position on this matter for the
reasons it stated in De Csepel: that FSIA § 1605 (a) (3)’s text does not call for the exhaustion of
local remedies; and that the text is comprehensive.102 In addition to those reasons, exhaustion
militates against the very international comity its proponents argue it supports. In Nazi-era stolen
property cases, the defendants do not argue that they support the Nazi regime. State defendants
such as Germany (Philipp; Cassirer; Ambar) and Hungary (Simon; Abelesz; Fischer) repudiate
the predecessor states that embraced Nazism. To rule in favor of plaintiffs today in cases which
involve expropriations from the 1933-1945 era thus is not an offense against these current
defendant states. To require exhaustion of local remedies in those countries which are actively
denying liability to the plaintiffs generally means that the plaintiffs will lose. This is what
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happened in Fischer103 when, after the Seventh Circuit required plaintiffs to exhaust their
remedies in Hungary, plaintiffs brought suit in Hungary.104 Among the Hungarian court’s
reasons for dismissing was lack of documentary evidence of plaintiff’s having been stripped of
possessions at the train tracks where she had stood waiting to be sent to Auschwitz.105
Finally, the exhaustion requirement under customary international law is not intended for
domestic courts such as those applying the FSIA, but for international tribunals adjudicating the
claims of two state parties. As the Restatement (Fourth) of U.S. Foreign Relations puts it, “[T]he
rule [of exhaustion of local remedies] cited by the Abelescz106 court applies by its terms to
"international," not domestic, proceedings. Accordingly, the interpretation of the statute that
does not require exhaustion appears to be the proper one.”107
After losing in the foreign state, plaintiffs’ options are few and far between. To obtain a
hearing in a U.S. court, the court must conclude that the foreign proceeding was fundamentally
inadequate.108 U.S. judges are highly reluctant to do this for reasons of international comity,
viewing such rulings as an offensive condemnation of the foreign state’s judiciary. The basic
guidelines for such a refusal to recognize and enforce a foreign proceeding were articulated by
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the Supreme Court in the late nineteenth century case of Hilton v. Guyot,109 and relate to
fundamental, procedural flaws as those capable of invalidating foreign judgments:
When an action is brought in a court of this country by a citizen of a foreign
country against one of our own citizens, to recover a sum of money adjudged by a
court of that country to be due from the defendant to the plaintiff, and the foreign
judgment appears to have been rendered by a competent court, having jurisdiction
of the cause and of the parties, and upon due allegations and proofs, and
opportunity to defend against them, and its proceedings are according to the
course of a civilized jurisprudence, and are stated in a clear and formal record, the
judgment is prima facie evidence, at least, of the truth of the matter adjudged; and
it should be held conclusive upon the merits tried in the foreign court, unless
some special ground is shown for impeaching the judgment, as by showing that it
was affected by fraud or prejudice, or that, by the principles of international law,
and by the comity of our own country, it should not be given full force and
effect.110

Thus, in FSIA Nazi-looted art cases, not only is there no reference to exhaustion in the text, and
not only is exhaustion intended for international, not domestic (such as FSIA) tribunals, but it is
the exhaustion of local remedies requirement that endangers standards of international comity
rather than granting jurisdiction under the FSIA.

D. State Versus Federal Law Conflict Rules in FSIA Cases
The Cassirer issue for which the Supreme Court did grant certiorari, and decided in 2022,
was whether federal or state conflict of laws rules apply to FSIA cases. The art in that case was
the Pissarro painting once owned by Lilly Cassirer, relative of Paul Cassirer, the well-known
German Jewish art dealer and publisher.111 Forced to turn over the painting to the Nazis to be able
to leave Germany, she was unable to locate it after the war.112 She eventually emigrated to the
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United States. After changing hands a number of times, the painting was sold to an instrumentality
of the Spanish government, the Thyssen-Bornemisza Foundation.113 After Lilly died, her son
Claude succeeded to her interests.114 It was he who discovered the whereabouts of the painting
from a friend who had seen the Spanish museum’s catalogue.115 Claude resided in California and
brought suit there.
The defendant does not dispute that the painting was stolen. It maintains, however, that
Spanish law applies to the case.116 Under Spanish law, a purchaser in good faith can obtain good
title after sufficient time.117 The plaintiff, on the other hand, argues that California law applies.
Under California law, a purchaser in good faith does not obtain good title.118 The defendant argued
that a federal common law choice-of-law rule applied, and that Erie119 was inapplicable to the
FSIA, while plaintiff argued that California’s choice-of-law rule applied.120
The Supreme Court resolved an ongoing circuit split in which the Ninth Circuit had been
the only circuit to apply a federal conflict-of-law rule to FSIA cases.121 The Court rejected the
applicability of federal common law, citing FSIA § 1606122 in support of the proposition that, “a
foreign state, if found ineligible for immunity, must answer for its conduct just as any other
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[private] actor would.”123 More precisely, this means that the choice-of-law rule for foreign
states and instrumentalities under the FSIA, once they have been found amenable to jurisdiction
under a Section 1605 exception, is the same as for any private party.124 Although Section 1606 is
clear in directing private party treatment for states lacking immunity under the FSIA, the
justification for this in conflict of laws cases has been challenged.125 The original rationale for
applying Erie to conflict of law cases was to eliminate disparate treatment within one state where
defendants were able to remove their cases to federal court on state law issues, potentially
leading to different outcomes within a state.126 Since FSIA cases all can be removed to federal
court, and are very rarely heard in state courts, this concern is de minimis.127
In vacating and remanding for further proceedings, the Court left the painting’s ownership
undecided. The district court had concluded, albeit cursorily, that plaintiff would lose under both
Spanish and California law.128 It has been suggested that the wisest course on remand would be
to certify to the California Supreme Court the issue of whose substantive law applies to the case,
since the federal courts are sitting in diversity as they apply state law in the way they believe the
state supreme court would.129
D. The Enhanced Significance for the FSIA of Suing a State Versus a State Instrumentality
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In another 2022 D.C. Circuit opinion dealing with Nazi-looted art and the FSIA, De Csepel v.
Republic of Hungary,130 the court heard a case which had repeatedly been in the courts, as had all
of those discussed in these pages.131 De Csepel is the most recent circuit court opinion to analyze
at length the distinction between foreign state and foreign state instrumentality, ruling that
plaintiffs’ suit was viable under the FSIA against Hungarian National Asset Management Inc.
(“MNV”)132 which exercises Hungary’s ownership rights with respect to the art that was the
subject of the proceeding.133 The De Csepel family had lost an immensely valuable art collection
when it had to escape Jewish persecution in Hungary.134 Their paintings first had been inventoried
under antisemitic laws of Hungary and, finally, were stolen by Eichmann.135 After the war, the
family was unable to retrieve its paintings, although it tried to do so through the courts of
Hungary.136 With respect to the paintings over which MNV exercised control, the lower court had
dismissed Hungary for lack of jurisdiction under the FSIA, such that the issue before the court was
whether it could exert FSIA jurisdiction over MNV but not Hungary. This, in turn, involved
whether MNV was an instrumentality of Hungary. The appellate court granted plaintiff’s
interlocutory appeal under 28 U.S.C. §1292 (b) as “involv[ing] a controlling question of law as to
which there is substantial ground for difference of opinion….”137
The court reasoned that a foreign state does not lose its immunity under FSIA §1605 (a) (3)
where the property at issue is not in the United States.138 This is a stricter application of foreign
state expropriation exception than has previously been the case, and one that is stricter than the
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statutory language requires or indicates. Section 1605 (a) (3)’s language with respect to foreign
states is that the exception applies to the foreign state where “rights in property taken in violation
of international law are in issue and that property or any property exchanged for such property is
present in the United States in connection with a commercial activity carried on in the United
States by the foreign state.”139 The De Csepel court analyzed this in a truncated manner, as
requiring for state immunity to be abrogated only where “the property in issue ‘is present in the
United States in connection with a commercial activity carried on in the United States by the
foreign state.’”140 Previous case law had accepted a much looser connection between the property
location and the foreign state’s amenability to jurisdiction under the FSIA. Thus, for example, in
Altmann, plaintiff’s paintings were in Austrian museums, yet the U.S. Supreme Court denied
Austria’s motion to dismiss under Section 1605 (a) (3). The De Csepel court created a starker
distinction than previously had existed between states and state instrumentalities by holding that
the looted property did not need to be located in the United States for the immunity exception to
apply to state instrumentalities.141 This distinction would bring a major and textually unwarranted
change to FSIA § 1605 (a) (3) if it is followed by other circuits and not overturned by the Supreme
Court.
The remaining portion of the analysis focused on two aspects of MNL’s argument: (1) it was
not an instrumentality of the government, but, rather, part of the government;142 and (2) Hungary
was an indispensable party, such that its dismissal required MNL’s. The court applied the wellestablished core functions test as to whether the entity’s functions are sovereign or commercial, to
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conclude that MNL was an instrumentality of the government rather than the government itself
because its function was commercial in nature, as opposed to having core governmental duties
such as declaring war.143 The court seemed to weigh as particularly important that MNV engaged
in managing property, “functions that private entities also perform.”144 The court also examined
the type of property MNL managed, including “energy, gambling [and] waste,”145 finding none of
them “inherently sovereign” activities.146 The court also rejected defendant’s argument that it
should be dismissed because Hungary was a required party to the suit, finding that Hungary was
“required” but not “indispensable” because Hungary’s interests coincided with MNL’s such that
MNL’s defense would in all ways represent Hungary’s interest vis-à-vis plaintiffs, reasoning that
is standard fare in sovereign activities analysis.147
IV.

Conclusion

Just in the years from 2021 to 2022, interpretation of the FSIA’s property expropriation
exception for Nazi looted art has evolved considerably. Because the FSIA is by its own terms, by
its legislative history and by court interpretation a comprehensive statute, the FSIA’s evolution has
not been in tandem with U.S. public policy to implement the Washington Principles and Terezin
Declaration, but it also has not been entirely independent of that background, and some of its
amended terms reflect those developments for looted art located in the United States.
Among the notable developments at the Supreme Court have been the end of the genocide
exception as an independent source of claims under FSIA § 1605 (a) (3); a renewed focus on issues
of substantive, as opposed to formal, citizenship for domestic takings analysis; and state, not
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federal, conflict-of-laws rules for FSIA cases. At the circuit court level, there has been a
reaffirmation by the D.C. Circuit of its pre-Philipp case law that the FSIA does not require the
exhaustion of local remedies, leaving an inter-circuit conflict in a decision that seems well
supported both by the statute and international customary law. Finally, in a decision that seems
difficult to support either in precedent or by the FSIA’s terms, the D.C. Circuit set a much higher
bar for suits against states than state instrumentalities when it read into the first clause of § 1605
(a) (3) the requirement that states remain immune from jurisdiction unless the looted art or other
property at issue is located in the United States.
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